

1967

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### Recommended Citation

Nabokov, Peter. "Reflections on the Alianza." *New Mexico Quarterly* 37, 4 (1967). <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmq/vol37/iss4/6>

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*Peter Nabokov*

## Reflections on the Alianza

### INTRODUCTION

IN THE MIDDLE of the six-day Arab-Israeli War a minor social eruption in New Mexico caused newspaper readers to blink their eyes and check the dateline to see if they were still in the twentieth century.

On June 5, 1967 a band of armed men attacked the county courthouse of Rio Arriba in the movie-set town of Tierra Amarilla. They shot and wounded a state policeman and a jailor and held the pink and blue building for two hours, before leaving in a getaway caravan with two hostages.

The raiders were allegedly members of an organization known as the "Alianza," or Alliance of Free City States. Four years earlier this group of Spanish Americans had incorporated as a nonprofit organization whose goal was the return of some 1,715 land grants comprising millions of southwestern acres to the descendants of their original Spanish owners. These lands had been given by the Spanish Crown and Mexican Government to the original pioneer settlers. But when the United States took over the lands after 1848, most of them were lost to various Anglo owners.

The organization's prime mover, Reies Lopez Tijerina, had come into New Mexico in the late 1950's from Texas via Arizona. His group's first public protest was a march from Albuquerque to Santa Fe in July, 1966. Its next demonstration was a camp-in at Echo Amphitheater in Rio Arriba County. But the amphitheater—a natural cavity in a sandstone cliff—is in Carson National Forest, and the "takeover" saw five members of the Alianza (including Tijerina and one of his four brothers) convicted in court a year later on various charges.

Then came June, 1967, and the publicized plan for a large Alianza meeting at Coyote in Rio Arriba County. The night before the meet-

ing many Alianza leaders were arrested. The meeting itself was described as a "bust" in the press.

Enraged, members of the Alianza assaulted the courthouse in an attempt to arrest the man they felt to be at the bottom of their injustice: the district attorney of the first judicial district of New Mexico. During the two hours they held the building they shot out windows, herded the county employees into a room, shot up state police cars, and terrified the entire town. But they failed to find the district attorney. After the largest manhunt in New Mexico history, with a mobilized National Guard to aid in the search, the alleged raiders were rounded up within the next two months. Their preliminary hearing, conducted in early February, saw eleven of the original twenty held over for trial on twenty-four counts reduced from first-degree kidnapping to false imprisonment.

#### I MODEL

FOUR OPTIONS are open to any minority group caught in the political and territorial confines of a majority group. One is to stay put, to accept the status decreed by the governing group and its ideology. Second is to try to return the majority group to an uncorrupt reestablishment of its original principles. Third is to revolt and grab the majority group's bastions of power, military or monetary. Finally, the minority can emigrate en masse.

These possibilities confront any minority caught in the flux of history. Each of the ideological choices implied has different relations to the use of physical force as an injurious or coercive act. Violence as a social or antisocial occurrence, violence as a tactic, and violence as a political *sine qua non* are socially regarded as entirely different beasts. The manner in which the minority group incorporates violence, what violence it permits and what it forbids, is often an index of what political choice that minority has made, no matter what it says it is doing.

Violence is a threat to the status quo. Unless it is acculturated, pacified, the majority group will not permit it. A gas chamber might be termed pacific violence in that it has the effect of maintaining the status quo. A bank robbery, a crime of passion, an assassination, could, depending on the majority group's code, be unlawful, *violent* violence, and thus bring down on the criminal some manner of *pacific* violence.

Often a fervent minority attempts to return the status quo to its alleged historical or mythological purity. Sometimes violence is em-

ployed as an illustrative or persuasive tactic toward this end. It can be used symbolically, or in a well-publicized court case chosen for its publicity impact. It can also become a demonstration of displeasure, and of the urgency of that displeasure. It is a rhetorical device to augment the often-disregarded power of words. It gives body to purpose. It is hint. It is threat. It is also gamble. He who waves the gun must be ready to use it. Reform carries within it the seed of revolution. And in revolution, violence is more than threat; it is the lever. It is *reducto ad arms*, even if no shot is fired. "Bloodless coups" and "quiet turnovers of power" only occur when the assailed party knows it is whipped. Resistance will not be tolerated, therefore it is up to the assailed party either to counter the coup, in which case open warfare is bound to ensue, or to accept the demands and bow out.

## II PEOPLE

AS SUCH A MINORITY GROUP, the Spanish Americans of northern New Mexico appear to face these options. As a discontented minority group, some of them have longed for something more than their permitted status quo. A portion found that longing satisfied when a Texas-born Spanish-American ex-evangelist named Reies Lopez Tijerina wandered into their communities.

Facing options does not mean one sees them. Given their social and political nature, the survival mechanisms of the localized power groups, the historical reluctance to corporate engagements, the Spanish Americans perceived no such political smorgasbord. Before the advent of Tijerina they made few forceful public choices. Their discontent leaked out in "unlawful," poorly-organized violence against Anglos, or in private family vendettas often precipitated by a drunken brawl or an unfaithful wife. These outlets temporarily alleviated the personal pressures but not the political situation. One problem was that their own status quo was not that of the American majority. Since the land shennanigans of the late nineteenth century a wild-west immunity has allowed for actions in violation of the majority group's stated laws.

When Reies Tijerina entered the northern villages in the late 1950's, he talked from an instinctive eye and ear through a gifted tongue. His words were not the fruit of a calculating brain; they vibrated with innate, rhetorical power. He struck all the blood chords: language, cul-

ture, and race. He stretched his amateurish historical research. His migrant Texas upbringing gave him little knowledge of 'the real political and cultural heritage of Spanish American "free city states," as he defined the historical land grant villages of northern New Mexico. But he had a vision. Along with a romanticised utopian return to past prosperity and personal freedom, he promised the northern disenchanting an ideological basketful. He would give them reform by forcing recognition of historical treaties affirmed once upon a time by the majority group. He would demand cultural recognition within the confines of the majority group. He gave them biological and royalist pride by reciting the very day when their "new breed"—the offspring of Spanish and Indian marriages—was decreed legal by King Ferdinand of Spain. Lumping revolution and emigration, he preached the escapist paradise of the Free City States, at once appealing to cultural nostalgia, current deprivation, buried racial pride, and political alienation.

The northern New Mexico villages had remained almost prepolitical in the general American sense, but they were and are a more essential component in the political structure of their respective counties than are most American communities. The villages do not vote from conscience or conviction. They do not sit in on county governing councils. They write few letters to their "representatives." But they are reliable fuel for their county political machines.

The northern New Mexican is for family and immediate community—what is left of it. He is conditioned to be wary of wider involvement. This has not always been the case. The first land-grant communities were self-contained, self-governing entities, with complex distribution of duties and controls. But the gradual destruction of their economic base made their populations revert instead of "progress."

Outside of family interaction remained the artificial "familia" of a *patron's* radiating circle of dependents, from its inner core of confidants to the subsistence farmer who every few years receives a sum to pull a lever with a name written over it. Adept at meeting the crisis needs of his extended "children," the *patron* can usually outlast progressive but inconsistent outside attempts to reform the status quo. Politics was not conceived as an arm of reform. "Politics" remains a dirty word and an accusation in the northern villages. The tactic which the villagers learned through rough handling by Spanish, Mexican, and

United States authorities was minimum involvement. With survival having top priority, the enjoyment of political choice was impossible.

But there were rumblings. Bandit gangs known as "gavillas" raided parts of Taos, San Miguel, Mora, and Colfax counties in the 1890's. San Miguel County later saw "Las Gorras Blancas," the "white caps," who terrorized Anglos, settling on their former land grants. Through the 1920's the "mano negro" or "black hand" activated crude insurgent activity—cattle rustling and arson—against Anglo ranchers and shopkeepers. Since then stud-horse shootings, fence-cuttings, and barn-burnings have served as an outlet for complex Spanish-American frustrations.

Besides, the central issue of land ownership, less identifiable but perhaps just as permeating fissures in village life were caused by two world wars, the revolutions in technology and communication, and the implied demand that rural America somehow join in. Yet resentment submerged itself in the desire to return to village security. Unlike the American Indian, the Spanish American was given no warning that outright conquest was at hand. Even then it is doubtful that there would have been any communal resistance, for village life under Spain and Mexico had come to depend to a large extent on local, intermediating "jefes" or chiefs. And unlike the American Indian, consolidated reaction had been sublimated to minimum involvement. But minimum involvement does not mean blindness.

There is a difference between violence as a last resort, as the animal reaction of either being cornered or wanting to see the whole works go up in flames, and violence as an habitual release. There is a difference between violence as culturally natural and violence as culturally unnatural. America defines violence as unnatural because of her pretensions to justice, peace, freedom, all of which it feels are both prerequisites and results of the democratic process. Hence the terror of Shirley Jackson's "The Lottery," where the trick lies in the reader's gradual awareness that an American community is participating in seasonal human sacrifice, with all the attendant emotions—gaiety, festiveness, expectancy—of a "pagan" culture.

But within America, among minority groups of peasant heritage, violence is sometimes a sanctioned expression. It is also frequently the correct political response prescribed by a code which functions alongside the established political code, and is the element which

keeps the two from amalgamating. Thirdly, it is the factor which often keeps the common people, caught between the two codes and forced to develop the savvy not to compromise either, from being assassinated by the Mafia for talking too much or being arrested by the police for aiding a "lawless" group.

In such a situation, law becomes relative, and under the pressure of both codes the common people learn consciously to react instead of act. Perhaps where their pride lodges they would like to make some sort of commitment. But the unconscious tactics of survival have become cultural habits. The people remain uninvolved, even if the battle is on the very fields they till.

The habits of leaving well enough alone, of distrust in cooperation or consolidation (although northern New Mexicans once cooperated to make their villages self-sufficient autonomous social cells) are the lessons of grim experience. Self-sacrifice is not within the ken of family-oriented villagers habituated for six generations to doing what they are told to do.

Thus when villagers precipitate violence it can barely be called a tactic. It is an explosion under pressure, a reaction followed by bewilderment even by its perpetrators. It is a sanctioned outlet, but whispered about and hidden from the outside world. Or it is an attempt to express group opinion without actually acknowledging, to outsiders or to themselves, that they are a group. Since lawful but effective consolidation has been decreed as out of the question, ad hoc secret groups undertake limited actions which are usually never tied to a calculated follow-through.

By virtue of their inherited psychology, the political choice of maintaining the status quo had been made by the northern New Mexican villagers in spite of themselves. They depend on their homegrown patrons to translate, both into their own tongue and into an understandable system of rewards, the demands of the dominant American system. They allow their young people to be lost to the barrios of industrial centers, and they let their aged fight to make a meager living on the dwindling distribution of grazing allotments from the Forest Service.

A myraid of cultural shocks and prejudicial atmospheres frustate the young caught between two ways of life. The dregs of village traditions, preoccupation with family ties, and the dreams of what has been are the opium of the traditional elements who remain in the villages.

## III CATALYST

REIES LOPEZ TIJERINA walked into a veritable gallery of archetypes of primitive leaders. He also became a catalyst for a variety of frustrations he was never fully to comprehend.

America is a cunning colonizer. In their time of country-claiming France and England shipped the cream of the native crop back to the old country's best schools. Somehow it never rang a bell that Mahatma Ghandi, Jomo Kenyetta and Ho Chi Minh would be stronger adversaries because of this assistance. For all its promises of equality and the availability of its civilized resources, America was much less generous to its subjugated peoples than these unapologetic colonizers. Thus Reies Tijerina's education began in a smattering of rural schools near migrant camps. It culminated in the Assembly of God Bible School in Ysleta, Texas.

Because of this limiting rather than liberating background, Tijerina never understood the dimensions of the instinctive, rhetorical, intellectual powers he possessed; he only intuited their results. He never remained at arm's distance from the effect he had on people, but he was never at ease with the cause of that effect, himself. He remains driven, guided and blinded by his intense intuition and the immediate feedback of faith he is gifted to instill. Living on the momentum of his undeniable charisma, he is not an analyzer and therefore not an initiator. His actions are inevitably reactions, either wild ones against the crimes inflicted by a dominant system on his poverty-stricken family in his youth, or specific ones on the heels of some sudden action by his official adversaries.

To the northern villages he brought a message incredibly attractive in its power and simplicity. Only a gifted man could overcome entrenched passivity and cynicism with this broad rallying cry. Only a gifted man could make such a message specific. It was that justice should prevail. Whether Tijerina himself was con artist or political agitator or true deliverer, it did not for a minute mean that America and her New Mexican citizens could deny the message, or ignore the underlying accusation. Tijerina's simplicity remains his handicap and his power.

His simplicity meant that he was never quite able to make his Alianza into an engine of reform. He was challenging the basic tenets of the dominant system by reverting to a simplistic basic principle which, apparently, had become superseded by intervening laws and



habits. The Establishment could pass off his calling it "hypocrite" because of his scatter-gun approach, but his accusations hang like a banner over New Mexico. They will remain whether Tijerina lives or dies.

While reform was out of the question—because he was adhering to laws which the dominant system said were outdated, de-legalized, negated through "right of adverse possession," archaic, almost mythological—something of Tijerina's words still struck receptive chords in a segment of the northern population.

Walter Lippmann analyzes this receptiveness in his *A Preface to Morals*. "When an agitator wishes to start a crusade, a religious revival, an inquisition, or some sort of jingo excitement, the further he goes from the centers of civilization the more following he can attract. It is in the backwoods and in the hill country, in kitchens and in old men's clubs, that fanaticism can be kindled. The urban crowd, if it has been urban for any length of time and has become used to its environment, may be fickle, faddish, nervous, unstable, but it lacks the concentration of energy to become fiercely excited for any length of time about anything. At its worst it is a raging mob, but it is not persistently fanatical. There are too many things to attract its attention for it to remain preoccupied for long with any one thing."

However northern New Mexico was not a calculation, says Tijerina, it was a divination. In a spirit true to one of the archetypal facets of a self-made messiah, Tijerina explains his coming to the northern villages by a dream:

"... I went to sleep, and in the morning the sun woke me and that white, how do you say, dew, had covered me all over. That night I asked God to show me the future of my life. It shaked me—shaked like this—it shaked all my life, from there I turned to New Mexico. I saw frozen horses, they started melting and coming to life in a very old kingdom, old walls. Then I saw three angels of law and they asked me to help them. They said they had come from a long ways, had travelled the earth and come for me. Those tall pines I saw meant New Mexico."

Tijerina is also the millenarian leader who foresees a time of eventual reckoning when the Spanish American will receive his land grants back. His own past history of voluntary poverty and cross-country preaching partly fits him into the pattern of such fundamentalist leaders as Anthony the Counselor, whose nineteenth-century messianic

revolt is described in the Brazilian epic, *Rebellion in the Back Lands*, by Euclides Da Cunha.

Again, Tijerina's character contains something of the archetypal Robin Hood style of social bandit. Conflicting with his idealistic platform and his expressed adherence to nonviolence is an obvious pride in his wiles as a fugitive. His statements reveal an enjoyment of contests with the law. In this life-gambling some observers have sensed a fatalism, an embracing of the encounter to have done with it, a desperate leap to unload some private demon from his back. Tijerina says it is the concept of Justice which drives him with such unrelenting force.

Writes E. J. Hobsbawm in his study of archaic forms of social agitation, *Primitive Rebels*: "It is important that the incipient social bandit should be regarded as 'honorable' or non-criminal by the population, for if he was regarded as criminal against local convention, he could not enjoy the local protection on which he must rely completely."

Reies could never trust the villages completely, partly because he did not come from them and partly because they are in such flux. But he could trust most of their traditionalists. The fact that he could find any refuge, however, was implicit proof that an entire segment of the northern population was politically and socially alienated from the country at large.

Hobsbawm further quotes from an Italian treatise on the origins of the social bandit. "The career of a bandit almost always begins with some incident, which is not in itself grave, but drives him into outlawry, a police charge for some offense brought against the man rather than for the crime. . . ."

The Tijerina clan has always attracted official dogging. Reies Tijerina attributes his talk-back, fight-back reputation to the spirit of his grandfather, who, he says, was finally hung by Texas Rangers. Reies himself has a propensity for scrapes with the law. His three-year utopian enterprise in Arizona, the establishment of a fundamentalist commune called the Valley of Peace, folded after civilian and police harassment. A larceny charge during this time made him a wanted criminal. The police scrutiny which surrounded the Tijerina brothers through their wanderings in Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico fits this same pattern.

Hobsbawm defines the goals of social banditry as "a universal and virtually unchanging phenomenon . . . little more than endemic

peasant protest against oppression and poverty; a cry for vengeance on the rich and the oppressors, a vague dream, of some curb upon them, a righting of individual wrongs. Its ambitions are modest: a traditional world in which men are justly dealt with . . . . It becomes epidemic rather than endemic when a peasant society which knows of no better means of self-defense is in a condition of abnormal tension and disruption."

For a man of Tijerina's drive and imagination, northern New Mexico was a logical last stop. It is the one pocket where something of what can be called Spanish-American culture still exists. For a Spanish American concerned with cultural roots and searching for an indigenous political and social model to inform his vision, it was his Athens—and his people's historical destiny.

But some of Tijerina archetypal characteristics were anachronistic in the second half of the twentieth century. They even conflicted with each other. The fundamentalist and the social bandit clashed over the specific use of violence. The millenarian and the reformer argued over the kind of future to plan for. The revolutionist and the messiah could not get together over the contradictions between long-range and short-range goals.

Whatever the inbuilt obstacles to a concrete, single-minded platform which married tactics with goals and realities, Tijerina did effect "a condition of abnormal tension and disruption" in New Mexico. How this condition will itself be employed as a tactic or a lever remains to be seen.

#### IV ORGANIZATION

IT WAS ACTUALLY A MINORITY within a minority which supplied the members of Reies Tijerina's Alliance of Federal Land Grants, now known as the Alliance of Free City States, or "Alianza." It had Spanish Americans who had found a niche and new values in Anglo society against it from the start. It threatened their compromises and their social investments. But there was a sublimated empathy even from some of these for the rural, romantic movement. An undercurrent of spirited satisfaction, of pride, even of vengeance, could be sensed after the Tierra Amarilla courthouse raid. Although if Tijerina had ever tried urban street warfare he would not have enjoyed the refuge of city Spanish-American homes—that would have meant too much

jeopardy, and in their own way they had transferred the rural tactic of minimum involvement into the city barrios. Still many were vaguely gratified that their historical injustices and veiled present derogation were being paid back.

The character of the Alianza was traditionalist. Violence was never defined as a tactic; in fact no tactics were defined. The movement operated on a pre-political, play-by-ear philosophy. The unifying factors were frustration and resentment, even if no attempt was made to dissect the variety of frustrations. But violence did lurk somewhere in the promises of total return to the northern villagers of their land-grant acreage, although violence was not a weapon which was stated as possible in either the arsenal of rhetoric or of actual victory. As it turned out, it lay only in the gun closet of retaliation. For the Alianza reflected the strategic cultural deficiency of both its leaders and its followers: its actions were always reactions. Somewhere overhead hung the visionary goals, the comforting fulfillment of a nostalgia born of despair, the romanticised return to a society where "La Raza" were again full citizens of their own communities. But a complete break existed between this static realm with its vague historic trappings—coats of arms, papal bulls, royal decrees, and historic treaties—and the busy, fluctuating, painful present.

As the Alianza emerged, its conservatism was its trademark. Although Tijerina never realized the gamut of frustrations for which he became a catalyst, he understood this bedrock traditionalism. For ten years he had wandered the country preaching from the Bible to just this sort of traditionalist audience. But he never really understood that the same support, based on nostalgia for old values, a return to a cultural golden age, a desire for the resurgence of village economics and family unity, meant that the Alianza had no future with its present following. Youth, caught between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, found little attraction in such dreams.

Tijerina's personal shift from concern over saving souls to the cause of retrieving land and a cultural heritage was another unconscious fulfillment of an archetypal pattern. But his earlier calling was still reflected in the rituals of the Alianza. The lax tent-meeting style of "convention" and the Saturday night rural dances in the Alianza headquarters were never strategy sessions. Tijerina would squander much of his rhetorical power by allowing himself to be the link between the speeches of others. The dramatics of these meetings were

cumulative and passive rather than aimed at any planned peak or purpose. The collection of donations by the old twenties, tens, and fives calls, the alternation of pointed jokes and slogans, the singing of homemade "corridos," the break for native food, the final hours of dancing to jukebox mariachi music, these had the air of a Sunday religious outing rather than of a political meeting.

Another device which Tijerina and his followers found necessary in order to channel their enthusiasm was personification of their enemies. Lawyers who had once served for land-grant organizations were prime targets. Politicians, past and present, were other King Johns. Anglo ranchers were also villains. Finally the Alianza found its Sheriff of Nottingham in the person of Santa Fe's district attorney, who had all the attributes of a villain. He was Spanish American, therefore a traitor to his people. For a brief period he had apparently served as attorney for the land-grant corporation which was the precursor to the Alianza. And he seemed to have a personal animosity toward the Tijerina brothers and their organization.

The pressures from within—unsophistication, little young blood, political and organizational immaturity—meant that the Alianza reversed the process of normal evolution for a grass-roots protest movement. From talk of justice and old treaties it reverted to social banditry, once it found itself unable—both because of these inner pressures and because of the overwhelming official might against it—to prepare any other viable coercive tactic. Except for its July, 1966, march, poor planning and lack of alternatives got it into hot water every time. That the Tierra Amarilla raid was such a publicity success, while it was actually a botched last-ditch maneuver of desperation, was due to outside forces which were to bewilder the Alianza so much that it never really capitalized on the raid.

The Alianza was never sure what the peculiar violent heritage of its membership could mean to it, and never brought the question out into the open. Partly this was because it could never decide whether it wanted reform or revolution. Actually it wanted something else: return. Thus when violence did occur, as ineffective force in the "take-over" of Echo Amphitheater in October, 1966, or as full-scale assault in Tierra Amarilla on June 5, it was not tactically linked to any strategy. Without a precise definition of long-range objectives in the cold reality of present-day America, it is unlikely that the Alianza will ever draw up a coherent strategy.

## V FUTURE

THE SHOTS FIRED AT TIERRA AMARILLA on June 5 were also heard around the world. To foreign countries it meant Le Far West was not dead. It diverted this nation from its impotent concentration on its solitary confinement in Vietnam. But to the Southwest and to the Spanish Americans in the cities it was a blessing not to be missed. It was the symbol which evoked Zapata and Murieta; it was the archetypal minority protest and had all the cinematic ingredients.

Increasing outside sympathy was the continual mishandling by local law-enforcement officials, whose questionable tactics had apparently brought about the raid and which continued to arouse public indignation in favor of the Alianza. Soon Denver, Los Angeles, and Texas Spanish-American organizations were either sending protest contingents or arranging alliances. A large convention held on October 21 and 22, 1967 highlighted both the triumph of the Alianza and the questions for its future.

It was attended by urban "chicano" militants, Black Power advocates of all stripes, and the hard-core Alianza. Although the speaker's platform in the Albuquerque Convention Center was festooned with the customary home-sewn coats of arms identifying various land grant pueblos, Tierra Amarilla no longer meant the 595,515-acre land grant but the incident which had made such a varied cultural gathering possible.

The Alianza stalwarts quickly learned of their organization's sudden and widespread reputation. They appeared almost awed by the switch caused by that handful of men on June 5. The urban was now paying tribute to the rural, the dislocated were paying homage to their roots, the young had come to praise the old. With that praise, however, was joined an unspoken message. Along with their tribute the speakers brought a subtle warning: the current nationwide winds of social discontent would ride over the stagnant, the nostalgic, and the romantic. Whether it liked it or not, the Alianza was now a particle in those winds. Beneath the expressions of unanimity and cooperation voiced by all at the convention lay the hard message that unless you adopted sophisticated methods, looked toward the problems and potential of your youth, and employed militant means, you would wither. If the Alianza remains the old-guard movement it has been, that weekend will have been its pinnacle moment.

As it stands, the organization could not last without its driving engine, Reies Tijerina. Although the recognition he gave to the plight of the northern villagers would not fade with his organization's demise, the Alianza could not survive without his energy. Changes are now being wrought in its infra-structure which suggest that it is broadening the scope of frustrations it will consolidate and that it is exploring new activities, both of protest and of social change.

After the Tierra Amarilla raid the Alianza made its rallying cry the legal support of the raid's defendants. It was outsiders who had to remind it of the significance of that event. It was they who had to coin the phrase, "We'd rather die in Tierra Amarilla than in Vietnam." The Alianza, given a great boost by the raid, immediately narrowed its focus to fund rallies—and this at a time when almost anything it said about the injustices to Spanish Americans, and any serious overtures it made for representation in federal or state poverty programs, would have been heeded. Instead, it pursued only the short-range exploitation of its new-found publicity.

The future of the Alianza will reflect the future of the villages. If they die it dies. If they consolidate into various micro-urban centers in the northern counties, perhaps the movement can adapt to this new direction and the new problems which will then certainly confront Spanish Americans who stay there.